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ABSTRACT
Through the aegis of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), China has 
embarked on an ambitious effort to regain prominence in innovation and academic 
contribution to knowledge after decades of relative neglect precipitated by the “cultural 
revolution.” Unfortunately, initial efforts made during the last decade of the 20th century 
resulted in quick growth in knowledge quantity (e.g., publications) that failed to generate 
sound growth in knowledge quality (e.g., citations). Incentives in place were not producing 
desired results. An innovative collaborative Internet-based Science Information System (ISIS) 
was applied nation-wide in 2003 in China’s Research Community (CRC) with a variety of 
embedded incentives to rectify the situation. The system has been well received. In the year 
2005 alone, ISIS helped the NSFC to process more than 53,000 on-line funding applications 
and 250,000 electronic reviews from 1,400 universities and research institutes in China. This 
paper is aimed at exploring Information Systems (IS) innovation impact from the perspective 
of incentive alignment based on CRC empirical results. Since the nation-wide application of 
ISIS in 2003, CRC outcomes have markedly improved. Discussion and directions for future 
research examine generalizability in the context of information systems for innovation and 
collaborative business. Conclusions are drawn.
Keywords: incentive alignment, game theory, electronic knowledge repositories, reward 
system, IS design
1 INTRODUCTION
Academic research and subsequent contribution to literature by Chinese scholars are only beginning to 
recover after the impact of the “cultural revolution.” Unfortunately, initial efforts in inducing 
contribution resulted in: perceived inequality for funding support, misconduct leading to publication 
quantity without quality, and general lack of recognition by the rest of the world. Quick growth in 
publication quantity saw only meagre growth in the number of citations. Simply put, incentives in 
place were not producing desired results. A game theory model is used to demonstrate that incentives 
to produce without appropriate inducements and attention to quality control tend to cause the situation 
that occurred. Counter-productive Nash equilibriums exist that require special attention to overcome.  
This burden fell upon the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) which is the largest 
and most prestigious government funding agency for basic research in China. 
To effectively and efficiently encourage sustained research and contribution to globally recognized 
literature, NSFC has embarked on an emphasis on the Internet-based Science Information System 
(ISIS, https://isis.nsfc.gov.cn). ISIS now annually manages qualified peer review, sharing of 
information and openness for critique, which culminated in research funding distribution for over 
60,000 grant submissions in 2006; this exemplifies an annual increase rate of over 15%. Independent, 
rationally-driven, merit-based research funding separating governmental politics from academic 
achievement and recognition has begun to be achieved. Empirical results to date (reported in this 
paper) illustrate solid progress in attaining system goals and objectives. Academic behavioral change 
has occurred and performance has improved. Information Systems (IS) supported innovation is on the 
way to illustrate positive results in a real-life complex domain. 
Use of ISIS for knowledge innovation leads us to several research questions: What is the innovation 
that ISIS puts into practice to win the trust of scientists? What are the incentives that ISIS conveys to 
support collaborative research and knowledge sharing among scientists? What are the influences of the 
application of ISIS from the perspective of knowledge management? What are the implications of ISIS 
for innovative and collaborative business? The first two questions are intended to explore the 
characteristics of ISIS within the framework of: Technology Adoption Model (Davis 1989), Incentive 
Alignment (Ba et al. 2001) and Game Theory modelling (Zhang et al. 2006). The last two questions 
are open questions and we draw conclusions based on our investigations. 
In this paper, we provide additional details of IS-supported innovation for China’s research 
community, including game theory analysis and empirical results to date. Discussion and directions 
for future research examine generalizability and comparison to other global systems in the context of 
information systems for innovation and collaborative business. Conclusions are drawn.
2 BACKGROUND
Within the academic community, ideas are formed (based, in part, on existing literature) that lead to 
proposals which (when subsequently funded) support research contributing to knowledge that is 
reported and subsequently cited in the academic literature. This tends to generate even more ideas and 
the cycle continues as we build up an ever larger body of knowledge. However, a number of problems 
can easily arise. For example, perceived inequalities in research funding support can be disruptive, as 
can proliferation of papers of dubious quality. Within the decade, misconduct (e.g., fraud and 
plagiarism) in the Chinese research community (CRC) has been frequently reported that has drawn 
considerable attention, e.g., Nature (Cyranoski 2006, Wang 2006) and Science magazine (Xin 2006).
A survey (Li 2004) based on 769 scientists funded by NSFC from 1995-1999 reported that 30% of the 
scientists had perceived misconducts occurring around them; 45.87% thought the problem was more 
serious than other countries and 48.66% thought it was as serious as others. Another survey (Chen &
He 2006) based on 1,072 scientists within CRC showed that 32.2% had strongly perceived 
misconducts occurring around them, up to 30% reported the problem to be serious or even worse. 
Another phenomenon within the scope of the CRC is the significant contrast between rapid increase in 
quantity versus low quality of the output. Although the rank of China in SCI counts changed from 15th 
in 1991 to 6th in 2002 (Jin 2004), its rank in Essential Science Indicators is only the 14th in the world 
and the 18th if SCI citation counts weighed. Since SCI was admitted as the only criteria in evaluating 
research productivity, such an incentive did not seem to lead CRC to enhance Research and 
Development (R&D) quality. Over 2 decades, researchers were striving to publish as many papers as 
possible, at the expense of quality. They are, however, facing ever increasing demands now for better 
performance coming from the government, industry and global scientific societies, accompanied by 
the inducement of Chinese innovation in conjunction with the most recent 5 year plan.
Generally, quality improvement is likely to be limited without quantity but quantity is no guarantee 
that quality will occur (Jin 2004). Accompanied by a lack of synthesized evaluation standards, large 
percentage of scientists did not focus on contributing high-quality knowledge to the community. 
Therefore, we have reason to believe that the incentives in place were not producing desired results.
Figure 1.  Information Systems Design Framework for Incentive Alignment
 (From Ba, Stallaert and Whinston, 2001)
In the context of incentive alignment, Ba, Stallaert and Whinston (2001, figure 1) developed a 
framework that presents factors which could be influenced by IS design (square boxes) and which 
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theories or disciplines (rounded boxes) might be relevant to explain the relationship between user 
behavior, the system’s objectives and the overall outcome. Central to the framework is the dialectical 
relationship (represented by the two arrows in the opposite directions) between user behavior and the 
mechanism incorporated in the information system. In the following part of our research, we are trying 
to explore both the user behavior and the outcome on the road to understanding incentive consistency 
and impact.
3 GAME THEORY MODEL
As noted, different incentive strategies can cause knowledge users and knowledge contributors to take 
different actions, moderated by exogenous variables. Then under what conditions will rewards be 
misleading? How can we design mechanisms to deal with the public good problem? In Zhang et al. 
(2006), we designed two game-theory models: a simple model and a complex model. The assumptions 
and proofs are omitted here, that is, only the concept and result are provided.
Figure 2.  Knowledge Sharing Dynamics
In public goods theory, individual rationality may lead to collective irrationality (Kollock 1999). We 
designed a 2 by 2 matrix as shown in figure 2, where the two decisions are the axes (Contribute - yes 
or no and Adopt - yes or no). We can also find similar problems in the context of “knowledge sharing 
dilemmas” (Cabrera & Cabrera 2002). Each quadrant represents a situation. Situations II, III, IV are 
considered to be troubling.
A simple model considers the “contribution or not contribution” decision. There are four possible 
Nash-Equilibriums (N-Es) (four quadrants are possible). The perfect situation is the N-E attained only 
when the threshold of users and contributors are all positive. Each user will contribute his/her
knowledge, and they all use others knowledge from systems. If the time cost of usage is sufficiently 
low, situation I is the only N-E. If reward is sufficiently high, situations I & IV are two possible N-Es.
A complex model considers the contribution of high or low quality knowledge. There are more 
possible N-Es than the simple model, which means that several situations may lead to the same 
equilibriums, and that users are more sensitive to the reward. When the reward is sufficiently high, it 
misleads participants to an ineffective situation, which is unique N-E, and the participants contribute a 
considerable quantity of low quality knowledge but do not use knowledge. This indicates that reward 
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Theoretically, we can identify the amount of reward that will lead to certain equilibriums. However, 
empirically, we are not able to calculate that. Therefore, our empirical study can shed light on the 
users’ behavior and the outcome of the IS application. If results show a certain situation occurring, we 
can deduce the possibility of inappropriate rewards being added.
4 INTERNET-BASED SCIENCE INFORMATION SYSTEM (ISIS)
The NSFC is a government organization directly affiliated to the State Council. It is the largest and 
most prestigious government funding agency for basic research in China. Since 2000, ISIS has been 
introduced by NSFC and generalized to nation-wide use in 2003.
ISIS is an end-to-end solution for researchers, universities/research institutes and NSFC to manage and 
disseminate their research information (e.g., projects and research outputs). It has greatly simplified 
the administration processes for application, evaluation and management of NSFC projects. It avoids 
duplication of data entry and reduces the administrative workload and human errors. It also 
standardizes the processes and technologies for R&D project administration. Its core functions are:
• Project Application: XML-based electronic document management and submission as well as 
decision-making support and online review and analysis of application statistics;
• Project Management: Project risk control, analysis of project statistics and project progress and 
completion reports; and
• Dissemination of Research Outputs: Submission of research results and search and publication of 
research results.
Any individual researcher can obtain general information on projects approved by the NSFC through 
ISIS, e.g., project history searches and duplication checks. NSFC program directors, research 
administrators in universities and research institutions can use ISIS for managing and monitoring the 
progress of NSFC projects. A major advantage of ISIS is that it allows non-registered users to obtain 
project information for public supervision (Li 2008). ISIS also accepts data exchanges from 
internet-based research information systems (IRIS) from participating universities and research 
institutions, which provides opportunities for extended system application such as institutionally
developed database-access-interface to ISIS, Data-exchange Software Packages and virtual research 
centres for international cooperation (Li 2008, He et al. 2007, Xie et al. 2008, Huang et al. 2003).
Good adoption comes from good IS design regarding to the TAM (Davis 1989) model, in the rest of 
the research, we do not track the trivial evidences of good IS design, but rather, the mechanism behind 
which brings innovation for CRC to overcome previous disadvantages.
With the application of ISIS, the R&D resource distribution process is becoming increasingly 
transparent. Scientists from all over the world as well as any individuals interested in the CRC are able 
to obtain information related to the grants, successful research projects and research outputs. Further, 
the mechanism of resource allocation goes toward an independent, rationally-driven, merit-based 
direction, while gradually separating governmental politics and academic achievement recognition. 
Growing participating and exchanging behavior has emerged, making it appropriate for us to study the 
problem in the context of electronic knowledge repositories. 
5 RESEARCH APPROACH
Based on previous theory model and the framework of “Information Systems Design Framework for 
Incentive Alignment” (Ba et al. 2001), our research approach is illustrated in figure 3.
Figure 3.  Research Approach Framework
We focused on the path of user behavior to the outcome of IS design. The dashed boxes are 
measurements for each end of the path. We compared the outcomes to the objectives of IS design to 
answer the questions posed in the introduction. Two exogenous factors (organizational incentive 
structure and mechanisms) are discussed via empirical results (the dashed arrows shows the 
explanation relationships).
5.1 Assessing mechanism improvement 
In the allocation of R&D resources, a number of biases were possible, e.g. gender, topic, education,
etc. The statistical data on submissions and the decisions of NSFC funding from 2001 to 2007 are used 
in this study. If incentives were not appropriate, the biases could be high from the result of funding
decisions. On the other hand, if incentives were aligned, there could be a trace left on the results of the 
decisions during the years of the study. In the CRC, many scientists believe that the 
“Power-Orientated” culture plays a role above mechanism suggesting that the fairness of the running 
mechanism of ISIS could be questioned. Under such circumstances, we would expect that a scientist 
would receive more scientific resources as his academic status rose. We collected the information of 
Academicians of Chinese Academy of Sciences who represents the highest academic status in the 
Science Community of China, and also measured the scientific resources by the number of research 
projects they received annually from NSFC. We additionally examined information transparency and 
richness as well as punishment for violations in the context of incentives. Rewards were considered to 
be a positive incentive and punishments a negative incentive, which works well as alignment. We 
observed the change of regulations and the report given by the Supervision Committee of NSFC. 
There were few reported incidences in the Misconduct Report before 2003. After 2003, it has been 
clearly published each year and provides specific project information. We also examined 
organizational level incentives to find how the NSFC monitors institutional performance and how 
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5.2 Ascertaining enhancement of Research Quality
To empirically examine enhancement of research quality, three disciplines (Earth Science, 
Chemistry and Management Science) were randomly chosen from the six disciplines that NSFC 
supports: Physics, Chemistry, Maths, Earth Science, Biology and Management Science. Three or four 
top journals were selected (also randomly) in each discipline with high Impact Factor in Journal 
Citation Reports database (JCR Science Edition 2006, ISI Web of Knowledge). The Nature and
Science Magazine (from 2000-2007) was also selected to reflect the trend for all natural science 
research outcomes. Papers published by Chinese scientists from 1987-2007 were counted, within 
which papers sponsored by NSFC were calculated. If the percentage of the NSFC sponsored papers 
increased, we felt we had reason to believe that the NSFC was doing a better job than other 
foundations in China in the field of basic research funding. Since the total amount of funding did 
increase, a higher percentage illustrates the enhancement which, in part, eliminates other factors 
influencing paper quality. We then tracked the funding record of the authors of those sponsored
papers. First, we examined their performance among all the applicants for the fund; then, we looked
into their collaborative behavior. The joint research fund for overseas Chinese young scholars 
represented the cross-district collaboration of researchers. We examined data for joint research 
funding from 2001 to 2007. By analyzing the funding percentage and award per project, we could see 
if NSFC rewards through the years encouraged researchers to collaborate. We also examined the 
number of proposals each year to reflect the researchers’ intention to share project knowledge.
6 RESULTS
Note:
1. In each year’s result, right bar represents the number of proposals with sum number on top, while left bar represents the 
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2. Data is from Annual Report of NSFC and NSFC web site (http://nsfc.gov.cn).
Figure 4. Funding for NSFC, from 2001 to 2007
Figure 4 illustrates NSFC funding from 2001-2007 with respective program proposal acceptance 
submission ratios. In general, we note the relatively increased equality and balance across all of the 
programs supported since the ISIS introduction in 2003 in conjunction with peer review in the 
presence of ever increasing submissions and funding. Competition remains keen in that over four out 
of five proposals go unfunded. Retaining motivation for contribution and sharing is a challenge.
As we mentioned previously, many Chinese scientists have believed that the “Power-Orientated” 
culture plays a role above mechanism so that the fairness of the running mechanism of ISIS could be 
questioned. We now examine that issue in more detail. From 2001 to 2005, the Chinese Academy of
Sciences accepted 159 new Academicians every other year. The number of newly elected 
Academicians was 56 in 2001, 58 in 2003 and 45 in 2005 (http://www.cas.ac.cn). Based on the project 
history search function of ISIS, we found among all the newly elected Academicians, there were 
29(52%) in 2001, 15(24%) in 2003 and 18(40%) in 2005 that had been funded by NSFC. We tracked
the record of the projects and counted the number of projects that they were in charge of from 1999 to 
2007, and then we ran tests for 4 groups of data through Wilcoxon Test to test if there was a 
significant increase in the number of projects. The groups were:
• Group 1: 2 years’ data before and after 2001 for newly elected Academicians in 2001
• Group 2: 2 years’ data before and after 2003 for newly elected Academicians in 2003
• Group 3: 2 years’ data before and after 2005 for newly elected Academicians in 2005
• Group 4: 4 years’ data before and after 2003 for newly elected Academicians in 2003
In the results, we indicate whether the changes are significant before and after the raise in their status.

















Note: “*” represents significant under 95% confidence interval.
Table 1.  Mean Statistics and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test of Different Groups
Table 1 shows that newly elected Academicians in 2001 received 0.46 unit more projects on average
and that this change is statistically significant. Newly elected Academicians in 2003 and 2005 did not 
show this trend. Before 2001, scientists would receive more scientific resources after their academic 
status was raised. In 2003 and 2005, this situation no longer existed. This implies that fairness in the 
process of resource allocation has been improved, especially after the application of ISIS in the year 
2003. ISIS submission data from 2003 to 2006 also demonstrate that female researchers are making 
more submissions annually (from 24% to 31%). A similar situation existed for Associate Professors 
compared to Professors (from 13% to 16%), indicative of enhanced equality following ISIS 
introduction. 
From the website of NSFC and the hyperlink to the Supervision Committee, no statistics on 
misconduct cases were published before 2003. Since 2004, the committee started to publish annual 
reports on the details of the misconduct cases. They even put the punishment decision reports online, 
providing detailed information on the misconducts. The numbers of the publicized misconduct cases 
were 16, 20 and 10 in 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively. Considering that the number of submissions 
and funded proposals nearly doubled during the period since the ISIS introduction in 2003, the trends 
are, indeed, encouraging.
In terms of organizational level incentives, the NSFC puts emphasis on group performance. In each 
year’s annual report, the top 20 universities and top 20 research institutions are listed according to 
their ability to garner NSFC grants. The number of organizations competing for the grants (shown in 
table 2) continues to grow. As a result, individual applicants are getting feedback and help from their 
organizations’ intellectual advisors responsible for the quality of proposals before they reach ISIS. In 
addition, most organizations have tied promotion and award decisions to researcher proposal success
(He et al. 2007, Su et al. 2007, Gu et al. 2008). Without organizational filters, ISIS would have to cope
with many more low quality proposals that could compromise its effectiveness.
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Applying for general 
projects
- 657/1200 672/1126 705/1319 768/1417 816/1576 857/1569
Funding Ratios - 54.75% 59.68% 53.45% 54.20% 51.78% 54.62%
Funding over 2 million 
RMB
94 129 137 181 222 259 -
Note: XXX/XXX represents organizations accepted / organizations applied.
Table 2    Organizational Funding Statistics
Chinese Scientists have also started to gain global recognition by improved research quality as noted 
through publications in top-tier journals. In table 3, the number of papers published by CRC in the 
selected top journals in Earth Science, Chemistry and Management Science has grown in recent years. 
On average, nearly half have been published with NSFC funding through the use of ISIS. Taking into 
consideration that the total time span is 20 years (1987-2007), it is noteworthy that more than half of 
the papers have been published in the most recent 4 years. To further understand the influence of the 
fund, we checked the background of those researchers who published papers under the NSFC fund in 
Earth Science and Chemistry. It turned out that 64.3% of researchers in Earth Science and 65.7% 
researchers in Chemistry were funded by multiple NSFC grants. This implies that they are not only 
productive researchers, but also active ISIS contributors and users.
Journal Impact Factor Total NSFC Before After
Area: Earth Science 1987-2007
CLIM DYNAM 3.468 27 12 4(33.33%) 8(66.67%)
ACTA ASTRONOM 3.451 1 1 0(0.00%) 1(100.00%)
B AM METEOROL SOC 3.055 16 1 0(0.00%) 1(100.00%)
Area: Chemistry 1987-2007
CHEM REV 26.054 25 13 4(30.77%) 9(69.23%)
ACCOUNTS CHEM RES 17.113 33 21 12(57.14%) 9(42.86%)
A NNU REV PHYS CHEM 11.25 3 2 0(0.00%) 2(100.00%)
Area: Management Science 1987-2007
PROD OPER MANAG 2.516 12 3 1(33.33%) 2(66.67%)
J OPER MANAG 2.042 9 2 0(0.00%) 2(66.67%)
TRANSPORT RES B-METH 1.761 63 13 6(46.15%) 7(53.85%)
MANAGE SCI 1.687 31 0 0(-) 0(-) 
Science 2000-2007 30.028 269 78 35(44.87%) 43(55.13%)
Nature 2000-2007 26.681 188 72 32(44.44%) 40(55.56%)
Note: Meanings of the columns are as below:
Total - total counts of papers with Chinese authors; NSFC - counts of papers sponsored by NSFC; 
Before - paper was received before 2003 (Including 2003); After - paper was received after 2003.
Table 3. NSFC Funded Papers in Top Journals
Table 4 shows the joint research fund of NSFC from 2001 to 2006. The intensity of sponsorship 
decreased a little in the recent 4 years, which means that it was more difficult for researchers to be
rewarded. Also, awards per project remained stable, regardless of RMB inflation, indicating that
material incentives reduced each year. However, it is noteworthy that the number of proposals grew 
each year, representing increased interest in international collaboration.
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Funding (Million RMB) 24.6 31.6 31.2 31.6 32 32 32
Proposals 285 316 346 359 426 452 391
Approved Projects 61 79 78 79 80 80 80
Intensity of sponsorship 21.40% 25.00% 22.54% 22.01% 18.78% 17.70% 20.72%
Award per project (Million RMB) 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Note: Information of funding, proposals and approved projects comes from annual report of NSFC.
Table 4. Joint research fund of NSFC
7 DISCUSSION
Returning to our research questions, we now place our results in the context of assertions we have 
made regarding ISIS impact and implications. The innovation that ISIS puts into practice to win the 
trust of scientists revolves around transparency. ISIS provides a systematic and consistent means to 
gather and evaluate research proposals with a sense of fairness and openness that historically has not 
been experienced. Results bear this out in the noted equality of funding (independent of professional 
status) that distinguishes the years after the ISIS introduction from those prior to 2003 and increased 
gender equity. Embedded incentives support collaborative research and knowledge sharing. Top 
scientists are not only knowledge sharers, but also part of the mechanism. They are members of 
peer-review systems, who have access to all kinds of resources. Maybe in the past, without the 
supervision from the public, they could benefit themselves easily; however, things have changed with
the help of ISIS. Those who used to benefit from role-based privileges have had to contribute 
high-quality proposals to preserve their reputations. 
From a knowledge management perspective, ISIS has provided a platform to deal with increased 
funding levels coupled with peer-review that provides easy exposure to proposal expectations (and 
examples for all), generating a positive feedback loop. The slowing of misconduct coupled with 
increased global recognition of Chinese contributions to knowledge is an end result, as demonstrated 
through publications in top journals. ISIS has provided an aligned incentive mechanism for positive 
reinforcement of goals, while providing consistent quality control as noted in the stable funding 
percentage statistics across programs. The implications of ISIS for innovative and collaborative 
business extend beyond application in China. The system is undergoing evaluation in other 
international contexts as well.
Limitations of our research are evident in that China is only one country with a unique history. There 
is no clear way to conclude that ISIS was the only contributor to the academic rise beyond helping 
manage the successful increase in funding support and proposal submissions. Future research will 
focus on continued tracking of Chinese academic influence, including citation analysis, always 
recognizing that there is a natural bias towards increased numbers of citations for older papers. 
Extensions to ISIS are also underway. Ease of use and comprehensive reports are the main current 
advantages of ISIS. It gives clear guidelines at each webpage, contains a demo presenting full 
processes for all kinds of users, allows seamless integration with IRIS, and provides rich sets of 
reports for the management with user editable report contents. Extensions focus on using ISIS to help 
identify prospective reviewers based on qualifications and better manage the review process 
accordingly.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have sought to illustrate how an information system, ISIS, with embedded incentives 
consistent with China’s goals of increased global recognition can help rectify traditional dysfunctional 
activity and promote increased contribution. Aspects of transparency and demonstrated equity have 
been achieved along with the sharing of knowledge that has led to an overall increase in quality 
proposals resulting in increased global recognition, as witnessed in publications in top journals. 
Extensive peer review has been supported and quality control has been attained. Global respect and 
credibility is evident as is reduction in academic misconduct. In short, the aligned incentive 
mechanisms embedded in ISIS have been successful. Extensions are envisioned to further automate 
decision making and effectiveness and efficiency.
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